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ABSTRACT The application of genetic technology seems to threaten what is
considered natural in elite sport. This paper explores the role of genetic technology in
elite sport and questions the significance of dichotomizing between the natural and
artificial element. How do shifts in technology affect the attribution of the human
element in athletic performance? To explore the attribution of human agency we
compare the genetic enhancement of athletes with two other shifts of the ‘natural
performance’ in sport: first, the introduction of a revolutionary high jump technique,
the Fosbury flop, in 1968; and, second, the introduction of the klapskate in speed
skating in 1997. The three cases show that artificiality as such can hardly be a
criterion for evaluating processes of innovation. The context of elite sport is itself
highly artificial. Boundaries between the natural body and the enhanced body are
the outcome of institutional processes of boundary work. When discussing new
technologies in sport it is better to ask if athletes are still playing the same game and
whether or not there are equal opportunities and an equal distribution of means for
playing the game. The introduction of gene technology may result in inequalities,
with great impact on the outcome of the game. This outcome may be considered
irrelevant for the inequalities that the game is supposed to produce and measure.
Genetic enhancement may also threaten the public view of athletes as moral agents
and possibly change the appreciation for human performance.
Keywords elite sport, Fosbury flop, gene doping, (gene) technology, klapskate,
natural versus artificial, relevant inequalities, sport ethics
Flopping, Klapping and Gene Doping:
Dichotomies Between ‘Natural’ and ‘Artificial’
in Elite Sport
Ivo van Hilvoorde, Rein Vos and Guido de Wert
The question of what exactly constitutes an honest and fair competition is
heavily debated within the philosophy of sport literature. The use of per-
formance-enhancing substances is an especially intriguing case. The illegiti-
mate use of performance-enhancing substances (such as blood doping or the
use of anabolic steroids) touches on fundamental ethical questions regarding
the internal goods of the sport practice (cf. MacIntyre, 1985; McNamee,
1995). It challenges the limits of individual freedom within a social commu-
nity, and may seem to justify strong variants of paternalism or even the crim-
inalization of individual athletes. Doping also provokes discomfort and
challenges the boundaries of fair sport. Discomfort about the anti-doping
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code1 stems from the inability of sport authorities and controlling institutes
to make sure that all competitors are following this code. Public indignation
is the result of uncertainties about whether or not the outcome of the game
is decided by an unequal access to new performance-enhancing substances.
Speculations about the possible application of gene technology in elite
sport make the issue even more complex. The World Anti-Doping Agency
(WADA) defines gene doping (or cell doping) as ‘the non-therapeutic use
of genes, genetic elements and/or cells that have the capacity to enhance
athletic performance’ (World Anti-Doping Agency, 2004: 6). It is, how-
ever, still uncertain if gene doping will become a safe technique for enhanc-
ing athletic performance, and if so, if this kind of enhancement will be
detectable. Other complexities involve questions of how to distinguish
between therapeutic and non-therapeutic interventions in elite sport and
how to define the natural body when genetic make-up can be modified.
Despite these complexities, anti-doping authorities treat this technology as
if it were the next illegitimate performance-enhancing method in a long
series. The same arguments are being used that had been used for all the
other illegal enhancements of athletic performance.
Most arguments for the anti-doping rule circle around the concepts of fair
play and health.2 Opponents of performance-enhancing substances often
argue that doping is unfair, as well as unnatural and unhealthy. To resist cer-
tain innovations, sport authorities often resort to an image of the pure and
unaffected game or make an appeal to the ‘tradition’ of a sport.3 Opponents
of the present doping policy criticize the criminalization of doping and empha-
size the responsibility of the individual athlete. Several authors also stress the
problems that arise with the use of concepts such as ‘natural’, ‘artificial’,
‘pure’, the ‘spirit of the game’, ‘internal goods’ or ‘cleanness’ (König, 1995;
Gugutzer, 2001). The presupposed dichotomies are susceptible to misunder-
standing and ideological misuse. In the name of the ‘essence’, the ‘nature’, the
‘purity’ or the ‘spirit’ of the sport, completely opposite claims are made. It
is not clear, for example, what the International Olympic Committee (IOC)
and WADA mean by using the concept ‘spirit of the game’. Critics of the anti-
doping policy use the same concepts to claim that elite sport by definition is
about transgressing the ‘natural limits’ of the body (Franke, 1988; König,
1995; Burke, 1997; Bette & Schimank, 2001; Gugutzer, 2001).
Several authors have stressed the necessity to transgress boundaries
within elite sport. Michael Burke even categorizes the Fosbury flop within
the same class of innovation as drug-use in sport:
Drug users test the latitude of the rules in a way that is not far removed
from the change that Dick Fosbury produced with his new technique as we
would like to think. New knowledge, technical innovation, training meth-
ods, new materials, and stronger, faster athletes all create redefinitions of
games. Athletes try to gain an edge and convince others that they have done
nothing wrong in gaining that edge. All testing of the latitude involves ego-
centric attempts by players to shape the practice. No one attempt is more
morally condemnable than any other. All attempts, whether successful or
not, involve the production of beneficiaries and victims. The drug user in
174 Social Studies of Science 37/2
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on October 25, 2012sss.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
modern times is a victim, just as the exponents of the scissors method of
high jumping were also victims. Both are victims of the aesthetic sensibili-
ties of the community. (Burke, 1997: 60)
Is it just a matter of ‘aesthetic sensibilities’, or is there more at stake when
comparing Fosbury’s technique with other transgressions of ‘natural per-
formance’? Which inequalities is sport supposed to measure? Sport can be
described as a voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles (Suits,
1988). Mountaineers take pleasure in ‘beating’ a mountain that happens to
be there. Sport is about challenge and artificial inefficiencies (Gelberg,
2002). For some, running around on a track is not ‘artificial’ enough: they
are even willing to jump over hurdles.
In addition to presenting obstacles, technology often aims to take away
unnecessary obstacles and inefficiencies through a process of rationaliza-
tion. Technology is supposed to make life easier and more comfortable,
which is generally not the goal in sport. The term ‘technology’ is used here
in a broad sense (Tiles & Oberdiek, 1995: 10). In this broad sense, tech-
niques and skills of the body are technologies as well (cf. Mauss, 1973
[1934]; Miah & Eassom, 2002: xix). Having a ‘good technique’ in sport
either requires a mastery of technological equipment or the body to achieve
the particular goals of a specific contest.
One can even claim that sporting performance is wholly the result of tech-
nological intervention (Shogan, 2002: 94). Technology and sport are, from
a historical and conceptual perspective, inseparable domains. As Eichberg
(1978, 1982) shows with the emergence of the stopwatch in athletics and
parallel bars in gymnastics, these innovations can only be understood when
the complex reciprocal interaction between socio-cultural behaviour and
technology is acknowledged. Not only is it misleading to suppose a one-
way influence of technology on sport, ‘rather, a new type of sports behav-
iour as part of the industrial change of society created a new technology’
(Eichberg, 1982: 55).
The most prominent – and often controversial – role of technology in
sport is generally to enhance efficiency. Technology may even take away
‘unnecessary obstacles’ that were once part of the specific goal of a sport.
For example, modern equipment makes it possible for an increasing num-
ber of people to climb Mount Everest. The obstacle ‘lack of oxygen’ can be
taken away by carrying oxygen up the mountain (creating, of course, a new
obstacle). One of the main characteristics of competitive sport is to meas-
ure performances with the aim of comparing differences in talent, skill and
dedication. Competitive sport can be characterized as a rule-governed
social practice in which the organization of equal opportunities (by way of
constitutive rules and levels of performance) makes it possible to express
relevant differences in abilities (Breivik, 2000; Loland, 2002).
This means that the outcome of the game should be decided by a bal-
anced and credible combination of human potential and technological assis-
tance. It does not exclude initial inequalities between opponents (in body
size for example), or even differences in material (such as in Formula One
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racing). These inequalities do, however, incorporate two crucial elements:
differences in strength (a light-weight boxer cannot show his boxing skills
against a heavy-weight boxer; in many sports women cannot show their full
potential when competing against men) and the ‘definition’ of the sport
itself (is the competition still measuring what it is supposed to measure?).
The principle of equal opportunity means (relevant) equality of opportu-
nity before the competition starts. Fair competition requires (relevant) a pri-
ori equal opportunities in spite of a posteriori inequality (König, 1995: 249),
but what is considered relevant strongly depends on the social–historical
context in which the sport has evolved (cf. Bottenburg, 2001). For exam-
ple, boxers and wrestlers are classified into weight categories. However,
unequal height in basketball and volleyball is accepted.
Sport needs a subtle balance between the rigidity of the obstacle and
the urge for records and ever-growing efficiency (cf. Gelberg, 1998).
Ongoing technological innovation forces each sport to always reconsider
this balance between tradition and technology, between equal opportunities
and relevant inequalities. What inequality is measured in sport, and what is
the role of technology? Recent developments within biotechnology may
take the concept of ‘equal opportunity’ to a very new stage. Is the modifi-
cation of genes for athletic purposes unfair in every case or can it enlarge
the possibility of an equal point of departure? If a sport contest measures
differences in the ‘dedication’ of athletes, what is wrong with equalizing
genetic make-up with regard to relevant features, such as maximum oxy-
gen uptake (VO2max) or muscle force?
The sporting body remains a site of both powerful idealization and
constraint and a prominent contested zone between nature and culture.
Athletes have to act on the ‘impossibly thin edge of the acceptable and the
unacceptable transgression of the body’s natural limits’ (Franklin, 1996:
S100). That means that elite athletes will continue to experiment with
boundaries, both of sport and their bodies. It might even be suggested that
athletes are encouraged to experiment and to technologize their bodies,
while at the same time risking punishment if they are caught doing so,
‘which is to say caught transgressing the boundaries of a nostalgia for an
innocent, human, pre-cybernetic body’ (Pronger, 1998: 286).
Sport authorities appeal to the innocent, human, pre-cybernetic body.
The IOC and WADA have an interest in adhering to distinctions such as
the one between natural and artificial. Based upon Latour’s (1993) analy-
sis of modern society, Gugutzer (2001: 220) argues that the modern dop-
ing crisis is intrinsically linked with a strong wish to hold on to the distinction
between the ‘natural, non-manipulated body’ (nature) and the ‘enhanced
body’ (society). This desire to demarcate between the ‘natural’ and the
‘unnatural’ also manifests in the IOC definition of doping. The IOC defines
drug-use or doping as ‘administration or use by a competitive athlete of any
substance foreign to the body, or any physiological substance taken in
abnormal quantity, or taken by an abnormal route of entry into the body,
with the sole intention of increasing in an artificial and unfair manner
his/her performance in competition’ (<www.wada-ama.org>).
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The question ‘What is an abnormal quantity?’ is, of course, a matter
of debate, but can be more or less pragmatically solved by setting exact
limits for specific substances. The inclusion of an ‘abnormal route of
entry’ in the IOC definition, for example, suggests that blood doping with
an injection is ‘unnatural’ compared with ‘natural’ high-altitude training
(or sleeping in a hypoxic tent or barometric chamber). The dichotomy
between natural and artificial seems to have an arbitrary place in this def-
inition. It is also hard to agree upon the third element in the definition:
‘What is foreign to the body?’. The use of ergogenic aids, such as anabolic
steroids and human growth hormone, is illegal in sport, but it may seem
unjustified to call these substances unnatural, in so far as they are pro-
duced in each person’s body.
Several authors give practical objections to definitions of the ‘natural’
and emphasize the necessity to transgress boundaries of the sport-body.
However, in spite of these objections and in spite of any tendency to meld
together human and machine, the polarity between natural and artificial
remains crucial. How do dichotomies such as these emerge, and what func-
tions do they have for different actors? There is an increasing interest in
empirical questions about the relevant contexts in which demarcations
emerge and become relevant (Franklin, 1996; Wesely, 2001; Butryn, 2002,
2003).4 What is the role of technology (including ‘body technique’) in
(re)constructing the relevant (in)equalities, and how does this role relate to
the attribution of agency to the performed inequality?
We intend to explore the role of genetic engineering in sport by com-
paring this new technology with two major innovations in sport in which
the dichotomy between natural and artificial is at stake. Genetic technol-
ogy in sport can be regarded as a technological modification ‘inside’ the
body, whereas the Fosbury flop introduces a ‘technological change of the
whole body’, and the klapskate in speed skating introduces a technological
change ‘external’ to the body. We chose these cases because the changes in
technology result(ed) in apparent inequalities. At the same time, there are
clear differences in the moral evaluation that accompanied the introduction
of these new technologies. The purpose of this paper is to explain some of
these differences. How are the new techniques introduced – by whom, and
under what conditions? Who, if anybody, resisted them? What are the par-
allels? Are dichotomies such as inside/outside, internal (physiology)/exter-
nal (technology) to the body or natural/artificial useful and relevant for
describing the dynamics and reciprocal relations between technology and
sport?
The Wizard of Foz and ‘The Way the Lord Meant Man to
High-Jump’
Organized sport has contributed enormously to the differentiation of
human jumping techniques. Team sports (such as soccer, American foot-
ball, hockey) require a continuous alertness and well-developed jumping
ability – for example, to score or elude opponents. In other sports, such as
van Hilvoorde,Vos & de Wert: Flopping, Klapping and Gene Doping 177
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on October 25, 2012sss.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
volleyball, basketball or hurdling, jumping is an even more essential part of
the game. In gymnastics, the height of a jump plays an important role
because it is evaluated with aesthetic criteria. In high jumping, it is just the
height of the bar that counts. Not least because of this simplicity, it is one
of the oldest games still present in modern sport and Olympics.
People are not born with a uniform, natural capacity for high jumping.
Even though high jumping has remained relatively uniform as a game, high
jumping techniques have undergone a remarkable evolution. The first
modern competition was organized in early 18th-century England. This
early competition shared important characteristics with the event today.
Each competitor was allowed to jump three times and was not allowed to
take off with two feet. One of the dominant techniques that developed at
the time is called the ‘scissors’. The high jumper runs up to the bar, swings
up the inside leg, and when this leg drops over the other side of the bar, the
jumper raises the other leg in a movement that mimics a scissor.
The first acknowledged world record was held by George Horine, who
jumped 2 m high in 1912. Horine developed a technique known as the
‘Western roll’. Slightly different variants were also called the straddle or
barrel roll. With the Western roll, the jumper first raises one leg and one
arm above the bar, and then follows with the torso and the rest of the body.
This was a controversial way of jumping, and officials tried to outlaw it
because people said this was diving rather than jumping over the bar. Until
1935, the bar had to be jumped over feet first. Other athletes were dis-
qualified based on this diving–jumping distinction. The legendary athlete
Babe Didricksen lost the gold medal in the 1932 Olympics because her
arms passed over the bar before her legs did so, and this was understood as
diving. Ideas of the ‘natural jump’ specified the inequalities that were con-
sidered relevant to the game.
After the rules changed, high jumping underwent several changes. One
of the most spectacular and revolutionary changes in high jumping was the
Fosbury flop, named after Dick Fosbury. Fosbury’s gold-winning flop dur-
ing the Olympics in Mexico City in 1968 (with 2.24 m) has become part of
collective sport memory. Walt Murphy, a track and field authority, remem-
bers that ‘[s]pectators were in awe the first time they saw it. When people
first saw him doing his Flop, they said: “this guy’s nuts”. Then they saw
what he was doing, and people began to take him seriously. The novelty
became the reality.’5 ‘The style is backward, but it may be avant-garde’, Roy
Blount Jr wrote in 1969 (at the time he was the editor of Sports Illustrated).
‘It defies tradition, but it could be the way the Lord meant man to high-
jump.’ Fosbury radically changed the technique of high jumping. Blount
describes his body almost as a new instrument, unconventional but efficient.
In detail, Fosbury charges up from slightly to the left of center with a gait
that may call to mind a two-legged camel, hooks to the right at the last
moment, plants his outside (or right) foot action of a ‘screw’, as he says,
so that his back turns abruptly to the bar and, ideally, rises seven feet and
change into the air. Then, cocking an eye over his shoulder at the bar, he
extends himself like a slightly apprehensive man lying back on a chaise
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lounge that’s too short for him and finally kicks his legs up – and falls flat
on his back. (Blount, 1969)
Several authors use the Fosbury flop to illustrate the importance and beauty
of innovation in sports (for example, Burke, 1997; Dixon, 2001). Fosbury
invented a more efficient technique, with his whole body as a performance-
enhancing instrument. Does it make sense to call this new technique ‘artifi-
cial’? Was he, for example, still competing in the same event as his opponents?
Fosbury’s technique may be considered artificial compared with the
already known jumping techniques. It was the unknown, the similarity with
the ‘two-legged camel’, that gave the jump an ‘unnatural’ appearance.
However, despite the fact that the new jump created some sort of inequal-
ity, it was nevertheless considered the result of a skill that is relevant for the
game. Fosbury just used his own body in accordance with the rules. Does
it make the flop in fact the natural way to high jump? There are two ele-
ments of this question: first, did this new jump fulfil perfectly the biome-
chanical demands for all jumpers (universality as a criterion for what is
considered natural); and, second, was there any role for technology which
forced people to draw a boundary between natural and artificial?
Universal Laws for the Best Way to Jump
Historical accounts of the process of developing the flop document that
there was no biomechanical ‘flop-theory’ prior to the flop itself. No supe-
rior theory of high jumping existed that just waited for application. Instead,
Fosbury’s struggle with height has been described as more or less an acci-
dental process. As a child, Fosbury had learned to use the scissors tech-
nique. In high school his coach tried to teach him the more efficient
straddle. Lack of success made Fosbury decide at age 16 to revert to the
scissors again. While trying to jump higher, Fosbury started ‘laying out’
increasingly. Years later, Fosbury described this process as follows:
And I am sitting there looking at the bar at 5-6, trying to figure out, ‘Now
how can I jump higher?’ I know I have to lift my butt up, because that is
usually where you knock the bar up. So as I try to lift my hips up, my
shoulders go back a little bit, and I clear 5-6. It was kind of a lazy scissors.
At 5-8, I lift my hips a little higher, and my shoulders go back a little fur-
ther, and I make it. At 5-10, same thing. By this time, I am going over the
bar flat on my back. I’m upside down from everyone else, into kind of a
back layout. I go out at 6-feet, and nobody knows what the heck I’m
doing. (Eggers, 1998)
It was a typical case of one step backwards and two steps forward. Fosbury
even surprised himself. ‘I was blessed to be the first. I am totally convinced
somebody was going to discover the technique. It just felt natural to me. I
didn’t know others would find it natural’ (Eggers, 1998).
Biomechanical explanations for the supposed superiority of the tech-
nique soon followed (although many were not convinced of the superior-
ity).6 Some said the flop was successful because it exposed a minimum area
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of the body to the bar and projected as little weight as possible above the
bar at any one time. The body goes over in a straight line, which is simpler
because human bodies are bilaterally symmetrical (Blount, 1969). The last
curved portion of the approach, which facilitates the required rotations
along the three body axes, is a unique characteristic of the flop.
In spite of Fosbury’s success, other jumpers and coaches were still con-
vinced that the straddle was potentially a more successful technique.7 Tom
Ecker wrote in one of the leading sport journals Track & Field News in
February 1978: ‘After close technical analysis of the individual styles of the
leading straddlers and floppers of the present and recent past, I believe the
straddle – if executed ideally – to be the more efficient technique of the two
and capable of attaining slightly higher marks.’8 After biomechanical analy-
sis, French national coach André Daniel wrote in L’Equipe (28 March
1978) that he was convinced that the straddle would be more efficient. ‘I
am sure that I can promise that in five years, the straddle will have shown
its absolute superiority over the flop.’9
Furthermore, the biomechanical advantages of the flop cannot always
be defined without considering characteristics of the specific high jumper.
Body height is especially important because the centre of gravity of taller
people is higher at take-off than that of shorter people. There are no per-
formance-determining factors that apply universally to all jumpers. The tall
(1.85 m) and long-legged Romanian Iolanda Balas, who dominated the
high jump between 1957 and 1967, expressed this as follows: ‘My style is
quite obsolete but it suits my body structure.’10
All coaches agreed that the Fosbury flop was much easier to learn than
the straddle. Beginners had better results with the flop and improved faster.
Ecker thought the straddle should be the high jump technique of the
future, but that it did not dominate because of the simplicity of the flop. In
his opinion, the flop de-skilled the high jump. The straddle, much more
complicated than the flop, had to be perfectly executed. If this had been the
dominant opinion, the flop could have been regarded as an irrelevant
‘advantage over the game’ or even forbidden based on the distinction
between high jumping and diving.11
Technology and Safety
The first flop was received with shock and awe. However, there was little or
no indignation. Rival high jumpers did not react as if they were being denied
secret knowledge of this innovative technique. Controversies on the best
way to jump were primarily technical and internal to the game. The new
jump did, however, arouse some controversy over its supposed safety risks.
For example, US Olympic coach Payton Jordan voiced serious doubts about
the safety of the new jump: ‘Kids imitate champions. If they try to imitate
Fosbury, he will wipe out an entire generation of high jumpers because they
will all have broken necks’ (quoted in Bigold, 1999). Several anti-flop arti-
cles were written about the supposed risks of vertebral damage.
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There are different views on the role of technology in this process of
innovation. Since technology made the high jump safer, some people sup-
posed that the new technique was only possible because of the possibility
of a safe landing. By reversing the interaction between technological knowl-
edge and sport practice, the superior role of technology can be stressed. A
typical example of reversing this relationship can be read on the website of
the Sport Technology Research Laboratory of the University of Calgary,
which addresses the question ‘Does sport technology devalue personal
achievement?’
What most people do not realize is that technology enabled Fosbury to
create his new technique. Up until the 1950s and early 1960s, the landing
area in high jumping and pole vaulting was a pit of sand. Then experi-
ments began with softer materials, first cork and rubber chips, and even-
tually the foam landing pit. Now jumpers didn’t have to land on their feet
after completing a jump. If Fosbury had tried his flop into a sand pit he
would likely have seriously injured himself. This is not to diminish Dick
Fosbury’s innovation and its effect on his sport, it is just to point out that
the technique innovation could not have happened without the technology
innovation occurring.12
This is, however, a false representation of history, because Fosbury did not
need the foam landing pit to discover the flop. He developed his style while
landing into wood-shavings. And he did injure himself. Technology did not
enable Fosbury, but followed him. This underlines Eichberg’s (1982: 55)
claim that the design and construction of objects are a result of changes in
behaviour rather than the other way around. Neither the technological
innovation leading to the foam landing pit nor a principle of biomechani-
cal theory preceded or directed Fosbury to his new technique. The inno-
vation that followed the new high jump technique was, however, crucial for
propagating the flop. Thanks to the soft and safe landing pit, the flop
attained the status of a ‘natural high jump technique’. The soft landing was
included as part of the game, and the technique of landing safe on one’s
feet became irrelevant for the game. Had Fosbury been the only athlete to
profit from a soft landing pit, it would have been considered an irrelevant
inequality.
People expect to see transgression of the ‘natural’ in elite sport, but
only as long as they leave organized equalities intact. In high jump compe-
titions, the most essential relevant inequality is the ability to jump higher
than the others. After the dichotomy between diving and jumping became
irrelevant to the game, the coordination of the jump became subordinate to
height as the major obstacle. The skill to innovate a dominant technique is
one of the sources of inequality people expect to see in this sport. After cen-
turies of training and selection, the event ‘chooses’ the ideal body structure
(usually tall, long legs) and technique.13 The ‘natural high jump’ emerges
within this alliance of obstacle and body characteristics. It emerges from
the superior way of high jumping.14
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The First Klap on Ice: A Huge Step for Speed Skating
There are people in north-west European countries for whom skating on
ice is as natural as carrying an umbrella. Skates are necessary ‘tools for
dealing with a frozen world’ (Whedon, 1988: 19). When watching people
learning how to skate it is hard to imagine that people have been skating
(on wooden strips or bones) since the beginning of the Christian era. The
Swiss sports museum in Basel even holds skates that are 4000 years old
(Koolhaas, 2000).
Much of the history of skating technique can be learned from looking
at old pictures and paintings (cf. Glöckle, 1987; Whedon, 1988; Blauw,
2001). This underlines the claim that there is a synchrony of changes of
sport at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century
(Eichberg, 1978). During this period, the dominance of feudal exercises
(including figure skating) shifted towards a dominance of sports of the
‘citius, altius, fortius’ type, the so-called c-g-s-sports (performance meas-
ured in centimetres, grams and seconds). When organized speed skating
originated at the end of the 19th century, the speed skates were primarily
designed for efficiency.
Highly influenced by globalization processes in sport, both the tech-
nique of speed skating and the design of skates have become increasingly
uniform. In spite of many innovations during the past centuries, one of
the most revolutionary changes of the speed skate took place only a few
years ago: the introduction of the klapskate.15 Contrary to the Fosbury
flop, the idea of the klapskate had been recorded for more than a century
before it was actually manufactured. Between 1884 and 1937, five
patents were granted based on similar ideas of a shoe that moves relative
to the blade.16
With klapskates, the skate disconnects from a skater’s boot. A hinge
beneath the ball of the foot between the shoe and the blade allows the foot
to rotate while the blade remains gliding on the ice (Houdijk, 2001). This
way, the skater stays in contact with the ice longer than with traditional
skates. It allows plantar flexion of the foot at the end of the push-off (Ingen
Schenau et al., 1996). The klapskate is a good example of a technological
innovation that results in a forced re-skilling of the game, which meant that
skaters had to ‘re-learn’ how to skate. At first, elite skaters did not want to
risk the investment and were not convinced by biomechanical theory. This
explains the long interval between the conception and actual introduction
of the klapskate.17 However, after the introduction of klapskates in elite
speed skating in 1997, the serious elite speed skater no longer had any
choice. Speed skaters on traditional skates could not keep up with all the
new records that were being made.
With conventional (‘Norwegian’) skates, one of the key aspects of good
skating technique is the ability to suppress plantar flexion. Otherwise, the
tip of the blade presses into the ice, which increases the ice friction
(Houdijk et al., 2001). The klapskate combines advantages of skating with
an ability to use plantar flexion, as in running.18 Some elite skaters reported
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a much ‘more natural’ feeling on the ice, while others could not get used
to the new clapping device. In the context of competitive speed skating,
many skaters perceived it as a rather artificial step in the evolution of the
speed skate. The skaters who spoke the most about artificiality were those
who did not use the new skates at all. Reactions that followed the intro-
duction of the klapskate in speed skating were not just related to the tech-
nology as such. Rather, a storm of indignation had to do with the timing
(just before the Winter Olympics of Nagano in 1998) and the secretive way
the skates were introduced.
‘Slapskates Melt Records, Anger Purists’, the Washington Post head-
lined on 30 November 1997. Under the headline ‘Technology Race is on,
and Dutch [K]lapskate has the Lead’, Tom Weir wrote in USA Today:
‘Virtually everyone outside the Netherlands’ inner circle of speedskaters
was surprised last season when the Dutch unveiled the [k]lapskate’ (Weir,
1997). Even Gerard Kemkers, Dutch coach of the US speed skaters dur-
ing the Nagano Olympics, was very surprised. ‘All of a sudden, our
skaters got beat by people who should not have beaten them.’ ‘Most of
our skaters did not get them, which meant we left last season with a feel-
ing of being behind.’ ‘Suddenly,’ Weir adds, ‘buying [k]lapskates was as
important as organizing workouts.’ Kemkers said: ‘To spend my time
with engineers is almost more important than spending time with my
skaters’ (Weir, 1997).
The inequality of opportunities experienced by rival skaters did not
only concern the unknown technology. The non-Dutch competitors were
also being frustrated in their attempt to purchase the klapskates. ‘Because
the Dutch have as much pride in their speedskaters as Americans do in
their basketball Dream Teamers, getting the [k]lapskates wasn’t a simple
cash transaction.’ Elite skater K.C. Boutiette complained: ‘we ordered
them, but they gave us a really crappy pair. They just didn’t want to give
us the good stuff’ (Weir, 1997). One of the reactions to this inequality in
opportunities was to blame the dominance of technology and to argue
that this technology would unfairly augment performance. ‘In one year,
we have had to go from traditional skates to these machines on ice’, top
US female sprinter Chris Witty said (quoted in Shipley, 1997). Boutiette’s
first reaction to the skates was one of dismay and a desire to bring another
innovation to the starting line. Boutiette said that he was bitter and
wanted to get a mountain bike, put studs on the tyres and show up with
that.
US Speedskating, the US international speed skating association, tried
to ban the klapskates for the season 1997–98, including the Winter
Olympic Games. President Bill Cushman declared in a letter: ‘in our view,
the slapskate is nothing more than a mechanical, performance-enhancing
device. We want to keep the sport pure. To our thinking, this is no differ-
ent than doping’ (quoted in Shipley, 1997). The International Skating
Union (ISU) shared a concern that the technological developments would
go ‘beyond reasonable limits’. The ISU tried to bridge the interests
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between a majority of indignant countries and the Netherlands, which had
a dominant voice within the skating community and institutional and com-
mercial interests in the matter as well (the klapskate generated much atten-
tion and many new records). The ISU did not do much more than to
propose a clause stating that ‘all energy expended during a race must orig-
inate from the metabolic work of the skater’.19
Rival skaters tried to construct an idea of the klapskate as a device that
takes over some of the skater’s work (similar to using a trampoline in high
jumping). According to Boutiette, ‘you don’t have to be technically perfect
on them. Someone could come out of nowhere who couldn’t skate on reg-
ular skates and really light it up on slapskates’ (quoted in Shipley, 1997).
Boutiette was convinced that the outcome of the game was not decided by
the superior skills that are central to the game (cf. Dixon, 2001). The
founding father of the klapskate, Van Ingen Schenau, replied to this sug-
gestion: ‘you have to deliver all the extra work yourself. The idea is not only
that more of the calf muscle is involved, but also the knee is much more
involved. It replaces one type of coordination with another that requires its
own type of perfection’ (quoted in Shipley, 1997). That is why some of the
elite skaters dropped back in their ranking: they were less successful in the
process of re-skilling.
Unlike the Fosbury case, there was clearly an imbalance between the
organization of equality and the measuring of relevant inequalities. During
the initial phase of transition, only a few skaters were in a position to use
the new skates.20 The advantage of the klapskate enabled some of the
skaters to close the gap between being sub-top and top. Dutchwoman
Tony de Jong was one of the first elite skaters on klapskates, and with these
skates she was able to beat the German Gunda Niemann for the first time
in a big event. She became European champion in 1997.21
From a biomechanical perspective, klapskating involves a more effi-
cient type of coordination. Yet, sport, as a rule-governed social practice, is
not just about maximizing efficiency. Athletic performances are governed
by laws of physics, but ultimately limited by arbitrary rules of sport. There
are sports in which restricted coordination is an essential part of the obsta-
cle itself. In competitive walking, for example, participants are not allowed
to run. One can argue that also in speed skating a specific type of coordi-
nation is being measured. External innovation changed some of the skills
and introduced another type of coordination. But more important, the
institutional decision to allow the klapskate to be used by just a few of the
competitors resulted in a new source of inequality: access to the newest
technology. This led to a conflict over how to account for the speed skat-
ing performance. The klapskater attributed the performance to successful
re-skilling and the courage to experiment with the new skate. Others attrib-
uted the performance to the superior skate, which was called a perform-
ance-enhancing device.
One important difference in Fosbury’s case is that, theoretically, every
high jumper could have initiated innovative high jumping techniques. The
ability to try out alternative styles in high jumping can be considered a skill
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that is part of the game. However, without the scientific means and with-
out the people willing to experiment with the klapskate, there would be no
possibility for an individual skater to change her style. Contrary to the flop
there was already explicit and scientific evidence of the superior technology
of the new skate.22 However, both the Fosbury Flop and the klapskate
required practice, and, ultimately, successful performance to demonstrate
the advantages of the new technique.
The technological change in speed skating was highly determined by
the needs of influential user-groups (cf. Bijker et al., 1987; Bijker, 1995).
In this case, the relevant user groups included a small country with a large
and successful tradition in speed skating, a scientific specialty that could
attach its research to the successes of the skaters, and an industry that fore-
saw a new market. The ability to re-skill is relevant to the game when most
competitors agree that it does not distort the game itself. The ability to pur-
chase new material or to fund research is usually not accepted as a relevant
inequality in sport. The distinction between a natural, human performance
on the one hand and technology on the other was created as a result of
moral discomfort. This discomfort originated in the unequal distribution of
technological equipment and thus a lack of equal opportunities before the
game actually started.
What was considered a ‘natural performance’ did not refer to some
kind of essence of how a human performance should be or how it should
be restricted. The idea of a ‘natural’ skating performance was challenged
by unfamiliar technique and technology. The unfamiliar became familiar
and accepted, first of all because of its superiority over traditional athletic
methods and technology. Although initially problematic, the transgression
of athletic limits eventually became non-controversial, after accessibility
was guaranteed for all competitors. The question now remains what ‘natu-
ral’ refers to in the case of modifying human genes.
Modification of Human Genes
There is a long history of the use of performance-enhancing substances
in elite sport (cf. Hoberman, 1992; Waddington, 2000). Every era can
be characterized by the use and detection of newly discovered sub-
stances to enhance athletic performance. One of the latest worries for
international sport organizations concerns the possibility of modifying
human genes. Large research programmes are searching for the location
of crucial genes that are related to athletic performance (Bouchard et al.,
1997; Wolfarth, 2002; Pérusse et al., 2003). Several candidate genes are
under scrutiny that might have a critical influence on specific sport tal-
ents. Features such as muscle size, muscle fibre composition (division of
fast- and slow-twitch fibres), heart size, lung size and volume, resting
heart rate, muscular strength, flexibility of joints and aerobic endurance
all have a strong genetic component (Skinner, 2001). There is evidence, for
example, that a polymorphism in the gene that encodes for angiotensin con-
verting enzyme (ACE), which is active in muscle tissue and regulates blood
van Hilvoorde,Vos & de Wert: Flopping, Klapping and Gene Doping 185
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on October 25, 2012sss.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
flow, is associated with performance in endurance events (Montgomery
et al., 1998).
Biogenetic experiments with mice and apes may be part of a prepara-
tory stage for developing the first genetically modified athlete. After inject-
ing a synthetic gene into the muscles (to produce more insulin-like growth
factor-1 [IGF-1]) the muscle force of ‘Schwarzenegger-mice’ increased by
60% after 1 month. Speculation has grown that in the near future the first
genetically modified athlete will enter the sports arena. Bouchard et al.
(1997) suggest that in the very near future (within the next 10–15 years)
the genetic engineering of super-elite athletes will not only be possible, but
also will be routinely practised in certain corners of the globe (Singer &
Janelle, 1999: 146). ‘The technology to make it come true could well arrive
even before 2008’ (Aschwanden, 2000).23 At this point, we shall concen-
trate on somatic genetic modification, because it is both controversial and
at the same time realistic enough to be taken seriously. Other possible
genetic applications, such as germ-line genetic modification or genetic
selection of individuals, are beyond the scope of this paper.24
The explicit anticipation by sports authorities of yet-to-be-realized
genetic modifications is rather unique in the history of performance-
enhancing substances. WADA has tried to keep up with all developments
within gene technology and repeats its militant statement: ‘For once, we
want to be ahead, not behind.’ This latest appearance of a symbiotic rela-
tionship between the medical system and the sports system involves
cooperation between WADA and leading geneticists. Ljungqvist, an anti-
doping official and head of WADA’s medical research committee,
acknowledged the organization’s cooperation with Theodore Friedmann,
an authority on gene therapy.25 To maintain its credibility as a controlling
institute, WADA actually needs to incorporate expertise on gene tech-
nology. With their urge to limit what WADA helps to create (namely the
extraordinary social and financial rewards for elite sports and records),
anti-doping authorities need to think like the most ambitious athletes
who are ‘dying to win’ (Houlihan, 2002). International sports institutes
such as IOC and WADA play an important (global) role in maintaining
the distinction between the ‘natural, non-manipulated body’ and the
‘enhanced, infected body’.
The protection of health is an important motive for constructing a
polarity between the natural and artificial. Even if genetic modification is
accepted as a safe technique, further controversy is likely to arise in con-
nection with the construction and perception of the natural and artificial.
This will raise two important questions. The first is the conceptual ques-
tion of whether the particular games will still measure the relevant inequal-
ities. Will dedication disappear, for example, as a necessary condition for
elite performance? The second question concerns the influence of public
appraisal. Will admiration for athletes change when they start modifying
their genes, and how could such modification change the evaluation of
(‘human’?) performance?
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Equalizing Genetic Inequalities?
If and when it becomes possible to modify human genes with the aim of
enhancing athletic performance, will the sports contest still measure the
relevant inequalities? Is there reason to fear the control and manipulation of
talent? The genetic lottery results in large inequalities on many different
levels. Will genetic enhancement influence these inequalities or differences
between people? Some authors believe biotechnology will endanger the
diversity of our species or even lead to a tyranny of the normal (for example,
Soderberg, 1998). Tamburrini (2002: 261) expects an unproblematic,
equalizing effect among individuals. He writes: ‘Genetic technology makes
it possible to reduce current gaps in skills and inherited traits between indi-
viduals.’ Biotechnology may reduce gaps within elite sport, but it seems
plausible to imagine that genetic modification will just as easily accentuate
some of the inequalities. For example, the more talented and better coor-
dinated soccer player may benefit more from a genetically enhanced max-
imum oxygen intake because he can better use his talent that way.
Gene technology will also increase public knowledge of genetic inequal-
ities. This raises the question of how such technology may influence the
concept of ‘equal opportunity’ in sport. Sport always combines elements of
control (mastered by means of certain skills) and elements of chance (not to
be confused with uncertain outcomes). If chance becomes too dominant,
sport loses its attraction and turns into a lottery. If sport is only a matter of
control, it threatens to become a scientific experiment or a test between bio-
engineers. In the discussion on the balance between control and chance, it
is important to distinguish between pre-game and in-game factors (Breivik,
2000: 149–51). Sport generally excludes as many ‘in-game’ chance factors
as possible. In a speed skating competition, it is possible that the first skater
profits from good weather conditions while the last skater has to skate in
snow and wind. Speed skating is by now highly standardized when it comes
to equalizing atmospheric conditions in indoor halls and cleaning the ice
(which makes the unequal distribution of klapskates even more significant).
Breivik pleads for the flourishing of chance during the pre-game
period, including genetic make-up as a variant of ‘anthropological chance’.
All elements of in-game chance that are relevant for winning a game should
in his view be eliminated as much as possible. The primary distributive
norm in sport should be meritocratic (Loland, 2002). A competition is sup-
posed to proceed according to the postulate of formal equality and open-
ness of the results (Bette & Schimank, 2001: 55). A just meritocracy means
that people should not be treated differently in significant matters based on
inequalities they cannot influence in any significant way. ‘Equals ought to
be treated equally, unequals can be treated unequally, and unequal treat-
ment ought to be in reasonable accordance with the inequality in question’
(Aristotle, quoted in Loland, 2000: 158). These general norms are, to a
certain extent, followed in sport. They mean that inequalities in perform-
ance lead to inequalities in the distribution of game advantages. Athletic
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performance should be a combination of talent and cultivation of talent, in
which the athlete’s efforts play the dominant role.
However, as the cases in this paper illustrate, there are potential con-
troversies about the meaning of ‘in reasonable accordance with the inequal-
ity in question’. An important characteristic of sport is that people are
treated differently based on differences that are not (yet) subject to human
influence. In addition, the outcome of the genetic lottery can be unfortu-
nate. Jacobs was only 1.73 m tall, but still one of the best high jumpers
ever, because he jumped 59 cm over his own height. Nevertheless, it is part
of the definition of the game that absolute height instead of relative height
is measured.
If it is possible to genetically modify certain features, and thus to
exclude elements of pre-game chance, it only has an equalizing effect when
genetic technology makes it possible to reduce gaps in talents. But again,
apart from the question of whether gene technology leaves the necessary
skills untouched, there is no reason to believe that gaps will be reduced
instead of widened. Besides, given the high costs, it seems more realistic
that – at least initially – only a small number of elite athletes may profit
from biotechnological applications.
The elimination of elements of ‘anthropological pre-game chance’ cer-
tainly changes the competition. It introduces new kinds of pre-competition
inequalities (comparable with secretly manufacturing new skates) and pos-
sibly changes the appreciation for human performance. When a pianist is
engineered to have large hands to be able to play Rachmaninov, the audi-
ence may equally enjoy the music (assuming the pianist is not competing
in a contest). This will not be the same in a sports contest. The principle
of equal opportunities remains powerful in competitive sports.
Breivik’s plea for a flourishing of anthropological chance during the
pre-game period must therefore also be related to the (im)possibilities to
control the elements of chance. Similar to the introduction of the klapskate,
if some people do start to modify elements of genetic chance, it forces other
competitors to make a choice. And that means that athletes who choose the
‘flourishing’ of anthropological chance in fact ‘choose’ not to be elite any-
more. There is one major difference from the klapskate: there is no 
klapping sound (or other clear evidence) as a sign that someone is geneti-
cally enhanced.
The Abjected Athlete
Suppose there are no health risks and there is enough bioengineering
expertise to genetically modify the size of the hands and feet of a swimmer.
In swimming this means a large increase of efficiency, comparable with the
klapskate.26 Are enlarged hands and feet more artificial than klapskates?
One can agree with Butryn that such genetic manipulation has the poten-
tial to challenge our ‘well accepted notions of human performance’
(Butryn, 2002: 113). This means that genetically modifying such elements
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of ‘pre-game chance’ challenges the understanding of the agent to which
we should attribute the performed inequality.
Butryn (2002) distinguishes between what he calls ‘self-technologies’
and technologies that remain ‘external to the athlete’. Self technologies
such as blood doping, genetic manipulation and even psychological inter-
ventions have the potential to challenge our ‘well accepted notions of
human performance … while technologies like aerodynamic bicycles, light-
weight shoes, and the Fosbury flop technique in the high jump simply allow
the athlete, as is, to compete in different ways’ (Butryn, 2002: 112–13).
However, did the klapskate not at first challenge some of the accepted
notions of human performance? It did at first. The distinction between nat-
ural and artificial is not stable. It is rather the outcome of an evaluative
process in which both the internal values of sport (like the ‘just’ and ‘equal’
game which is largely based upon the tradition of a specific sport) and
external values (health, safety) play an important role.
What is the difference between a swimmer who is ‘naturally born’ with
shoe size 17 and someone who is genetically modified to become an elite
swimmer? Questions about the accepted notions of ‘natural human per-
formance’ in a fair and equal game cannot be answered sufficiently in ana-
lytical terms. In the public admiration for athletic performance, two factors
play a crucial role: the supposed autonomy of the athlete27 and respect for
taboos and boundaries. The admiration of a ‘natural’ athletic performance
includes the distinctions between the ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ body. For a better
understanding of the difference in valuation of the work of the bio-mechan-
ical or the bio-chemical engineer, one has to understand the logic of abjection
concerning the boundaries of the body. The biomechanical engineer, disci-
plining the human body in order to reduce the performance to mechanical
laws, does not ‘intrude’ upon the social boundaries of the body. Unlike the
biogenetic engineer (s)he works on the ‘outer, visible body’, instead of the
‘inner, non-visible body’.
The question of why athletic performances may lose their attraction is
not just a matter of more or less artificiality. It also has to do with the role
of athletes as models, exemplars. The ‘abjected athlete’ is an athlete who
transgresses socially constructed boundaries, including gender boundaries
(cf. Burke & Roberts, 1997). The masculinization of woman in elite sport
evokes ‘fears of the monstrous feminine’ (Magdalinski & Brooks, 2002).
Genetic modification may also threaten the public view of athletes as moral
agents. ‘If we look too closely at the athlete’s singular efforts to gain a per-
ceived competitive edge, we are likely to find an ignoble flaw that will bring
us to what Julia Kristeva calls abjection’ (Fairchild, 1989: 77).
Is it plausible to imagine that people will value a genetically modified
athlete in the same way as they cheered for Fosbury? Some argue that it is
a pessimistic fear of new technology to think that this is not possible.
According to Butryn (2003), we should see athletes as cyborgs who are inex-
tricably tied to a range of sports technologies. His view would help to alle-
viate the tension between the ‘natural’ and ‘artificial’, ‘because it carries
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with it the recognition that elite athletes do not simply enter into competi-
tions as technological tabulae rasae’ (Butryn, 2003: 18). Of course, the nat-
ural athlete has never existed, but neither has the natural performance.
Athletes have always interacted with and been shaped by various technolo-
gies since birth (Butryn, 2002: 18). Not even the first jump made by a child
is devoid of enculturation. Does this omnipresence of technology in elite
sport mean that the modification of genes falls within the same category as
the introduction of the klapskate? Not quite, because of the already men-
tioned moral and aesthetic implications. There are differences in the
acceptance of both technologies, because genetic enhancement trans-
gresses limits of the socially accepted notions of a human performance.
This notion of a human performance also includes physical appearance.
Although there are no clear limitations to a particular body concept in sport
(think of the extreme size of Japanese sumo wrestlers), abjection does play
a role in each sport in constructing the natural and artificial. Swimmers
with webbed feet are not considered ‘natural’.
One can argue that the audience gets used to disproportionate physi-
cal features, just like the adaptation to changes in body technique. The shift
from ‘lucky genes’ to ‘designer genes’ is, however, unlike the shift from
straddle to flop. The history of elite sports teaches that processes of nor-
malization in elite performance do not include doping in the way they
include changes in equipment and technique. Most performance-enhanc-
ing substances that were used in the early days of professional sports are
still surrounded by an air of artificiality and even criminality. Anabolic
steroids have been used for many decades, but are not accepted outside
body-building circles (Shapin, 2005).
Sports institutions have been successful in constructing and upholding
distinctions between the natural, unaffected body and the enhanced body.
Nevertheless, some commentators fear that genetic modification will break
down the distinction between the natural and artificial in sport (for exam-
ple, Hoberman, 1992). However, the boundary between the natural body
and the enhanced body is the outcome of the institutional processes of
boundary work. There is no difference between genetic modification and
other performance-enhancing substances in that they all depend on sport
authorities and available technological means to prove the illegal enhance-
ment of the ‘natural body’. In the absence of detection of some kind of
genetic modification, the athletic body remains ‘natural’. The construction
of a credible dichotomy highly depends on the use of gene experts and gene
technology to make the audience believe that the genetically enhanced ath-
lete is not given an unfair chance to succeed.
Conclusion
The Fosbury flop, klapskates and gene doping all challenge the notions of
‘natural performance’ in elite sport in different ways. The objective of this
paper was to understand some of the differences and nuances of the
dichotomy between natural and artificial. Other dichotomies between
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inside/outside and internal/external regions of the body also represent the
cultural paradox of being both preoccupied with purity, while at the same
time stimulating the cult of sport records. Dichotomies such as these are
used in a variety of contexts in sport, by a variety of actors with different,
often opposing, interests.
The case of genetic enhancement illustrates an increasing discrepancy
between discourses on the athlete-as-cyborg and the institutional represen-
tation of a ‘pure and honest sport’ for the wider public. These processes of
hybridization and purification seem to be two sides of the same coin. The
search for natural bodies cannot do without the unnatural, the enhanced
and criminalized body (see Cole & Orlie, 1995: 238–39). There is, how-
ever, little use in defining the good sporting contest on the basis of a rigid
distinction between natural and artificial. The principle that ‘sport should
be fair and enable equal opportunities for all’ is hard to unite with the prin-
ciple that ‘sport should be about transgressing boundaries’. These oppos-
ing, deontological arguments are based upon incompatible presumptions
regarding the definition or the ‘nature’ of sport. At the same time, they may
be more alike in terms of consequences: ‘anything goes’ in elite sport as
long as it remains within rational limits of taking health risks.
The three cases show that artificiality as such can hardly be a criterion
by which one can evaluate processes of innovation. The context of elite
sport is highly artificial in itself. When discussing new technologies in sport
it is better to ask if athletes are still playing the same game and whether or
not there is an equal distribution of means. What are the influences of spe-
cific technological innovations on the relevant inequalities that emerge in a
specific game? Athletes accept inefficiencies ‘not because ethics require
them or the law mandates them, but because such inefficient means create
the test they want to take’ (Gelberg, 1998: 95).
The three cases also illustrate different attitudes towards the transgres-
sion of publicly accepted, athletic performances. Initially, new techniques
and technology are often accompanied by concerns for health. Important
for the acceptance of the Fosbury flop was the assurance that every jumper
could be guaranteed a safe landing. Besides, the athletic edge gained by
Fosbury could be attributed to his own athletic skills. The difference in
technique is regarded as a relevant inequality that is part of the game. The
initial differences in skating performance as a result of the klapskate could
not just be attributed to the klapskater’s merit. Unequal distribution of
technological means surrounding the introduction of the klapskate was in
fact not relevant for the skating contest itself. Only after the new technol-
ogy became accessible to all skaters did the re-skilling of skating technique
become an accepted element of the skating contest.
The use of performance-enhancing substances is generally excluded in
elite sport because of health concerns and the protection of an honest and
fair competition. As yet, health risks are the most powerful objection
against the use of gene technology to enhance elite sport performances. It
is intriguing to consider speculations about the radical changes that might
be expected in elite sport when gene doping does become a safe technique
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and when it appears to be a non-detectable way of enhancing the athlete’s
body. Some argue that it is, or will inevitably become, part of the athletic
skill to know what substances can and should be used – in other words, that
drug-use may become a form of athleticism in itself. However, most peo-
ple will agree that it is not a relevant aspect of the game to know what to
inject, or where and when to inject it (cf. Shapin, 2005).
In the preparatory stages of gene technology, before it ever proves to be
a safe technique, athletes have to be willing to experiment and accept the
unknown effects of this new technology. Even when medical ethical princi-
ples such as ‘informed consent’ or ‘negotiated consent’ are met, and even
when gene doping appears to be a safe technique, it is hard to imagine that
it will ever lead to the kind of appraisal that has been given to the early exe-
cution of the Fosbury flop and the mastery of the klapskate.
Burke calls the Fosbury flop a ‘masterful redefinition, which was toler-
ated within the practice of sport because it was both instrumentally effec-
tive and aesthetically appreciated’ (1997: 61). Burke is right to stress the
importance of the aesthetic sensibilities of the sport community. On the
other hand, the comparison between the Fosbury flop and (bio)technolog-
ical innovation falls short in terms of health risks (cf. Holowchak, 2000:
46–47). The paradigm shift within high jumping was soon followed by the
construction of a safer landing pit.
One can argue that the first athlete with the courage to experiment with
new technology should be credited with gaining an edge over opponents.
Does this also apply for the first athlete who dares to enhance his or her
genes? The fact that biotechnological experiments do not have their own
foam landing pit means that it would take another kind of courage. There
is a major difference between the sport-technical risks taken to re-skill the
game (the ‘athletic step back’ by Fosbury and the first klapskaters) and the
‘courage’ to accept extreme health risks for athletic purposes. Instead of a
mutual concern for excellence, athletic prowess, skill and dexterity, the
contest would then become a game dominated by ‘athletic dare-devils’.
Some of the individual sports in which strength is of major importance may
adapt features that are common within extreme bodybuilding: ‘the one
who dies with the most muscles wins’. The Fosbury flop was a technolog-
ical innovation without the widespread (medical and social) implications
that gene technology may have.
The analogy between Fosbury and gene doping also falls short of
acknowledging the relevance of the organized equalities and the valuation
of the relevant inequalities. The introduction of gene technology in sport
may in fact result in enormous inequalities, with major impact on the out-
come of a game. This outcome may be considered irrelevant for the
inequalities that the game is supposed to measure.
The relatively individualistic and autonomous process of searching for
an alternative technique explains part of the symbolism of Fosbury’s flop.
The ‘ownership’ of athletic performance has become less and less a matter
of the individual athlete. Inventing a new high jump technique is consid-
ered an individual skill that is central to the game. Technological skills,
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such as inventing a klapskate or modifying genes, are not sport-specific
skills, but they do influence major characteristics of sport. The klapskate is
the result of more than a century of scientific research.
Fears surrounding the introduction of the klapskate were not expressed
in terms of health risks, but rather in terms of fears of the dominance of
technology and a radical change of the game. Like the case of the klapskate,
gene doping involves the ‘intrusion’ of scientific innovation within the con-
text of elite sport. Unlike Fosbury’s search for the ideal way to jump, no
one credits an athlete with the invention of a skate or the identification and
enhancement of genes. Differences in competitive outcome that are based
upon these ‘external’ inventions may be considered irrelevant inequalities.
Inequalities become even less relevant to the sport itself when the distribu-
tion of technological means is unequal or the introduction is surrounded by
secrecy.
If the new technology remains largely invisible and non-detectable it
might break down the trust within the elite sport community. On the other
hand, when genetic enhancement becomes so fine-tuned to the human
body, as though the athlete was ‘natural born’ with the newly acquired
capacities, and it does not dramatically affect the dedication that is still
needed to excel, the attribution of the performed inequalities may still be
directed to the athlete. Gene experts who would like to claim part of the
merit for athletic success are bounded by legal restrictions and the current
system of secrecy.
The most important difference that sets the discussion of gene tech-
nology apart from the two other cases is the potential impact of this tech-
nology, which is not restricted to the context of elite sport itself. Apart from
some local nostalgia, the klapskate and the flop have little or no impact on
society. The impact of biotechnology is much more embedded within a
broader discussion of enhancing human features (cf. Gezondheidsraad,
2003; President’s Council of Bioethics, 2003). It is not just about being a
good or better skater or high jumper, it is about the question whether or not
we should allow people to become ‘better than well’ in general, not just as
athletes but as human beings. It is also about limiting the ‘open futures’ of
children who do not themselves choose to be athletes. This also means that
this discussion cannot be dealt with just within the context of sport institu-
tions such as WADA, which exists in order to detect and punish. Allowing
gene technology is not the same as allowing a high jumper to jump ‘head
first’. It could not only change the face of sport, but also change the iden-
tity of human beings in general.
The impact of biotechnology may be enormous in the near future.
While recognizing that the impact of gene technology in sport may be great,
one also has to be cautious to avoid ‘genetic exceptionalism’. The discus-
sion of human enhancement is a broad moral and social issue that is not
restricted to the application of gene technology. There is little doubt that
the credibility of major institutions such as the IOC and elite sport in gen-
eral is at stake. Such institutions must deal with various, possibly incom-
patible ideas about the honest and good sports performance. Given the
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increasing interests, interdependencies and innovation processes in elite
sport, and given the necessity of highly enhanced and ‘artificial’ environ-
ments of modern athletes, it will remain of great importance to protect cer-
tain boundaries of good and humanlike practices of elite sport.
Notes
We would like to thank Bernike Pasveer and Roland Bal for organizing the meeting
‘Extreme Bodies’ in Maastricht, where this paper was first presented, as well as Heather
Sheridan, Andy Miah, Michael Lynch and three referees of this journal for reviewing and
commenting on this paper.
1. The fundamental rationale for the anti-doping code is formulated as follows: 
Anti-doping programs seek to preserve what is intrinsically valuable about sport.
The intrinsic value is often referred to as ‘the spirit of sport’; it is the essence of
Olympism; it is how we play true. The spirit of sport is the celebration of the human
spirit, body and mind, and is characterized by the following values: ethics, fair play
and honesty, health, excellence in performance, character and education, fun and
joy, teamwork, dedication and commitment, respect for rules and laws, respect for
self and other participants, courage, community and solidarity. Doping is funda-
mentally contrary to the spirit of sport. (World Anti-Doping Agency, 2003: 7–8)
WADA president Dick Pound recently cited marijuana as an example of a substance
(although not enhancing sport performance) that is contrary to ‘the spirit of sport’.
2. See for example: Brown, 1990; McNamee, 1995; Schneider & Butcher, 2000;
Holowchak, 2000; Dixon, 2001; Gugutzer, 2001.
3. This has been the case with the changing definition of a bicycle a decade ago. In 1993
Graeme Obree introduced a (homemade) revolutionary design to break the world hour
record (with the arms completely under the breast and the nose almost on the front
wheel). A year later Obree introduced the ‘Superman position’, with the arms stretched
out on the handlebars like a downhill skier. Several records followed after which the
Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) created new rules that restricted the definition of a
racing bike. In 2000 the UCI even decided to create two records, namely the ‘UCI
Hour Record’ and the ‘Best Hour Performance’. ‘This distinction allowed for respect of
a long tradition of classic cycling, without endangering the vital modern aspect of our
sport’ (Union Cycliste Internationale, Press release, 9 September 2000).
4. A good example of a context-specific dichotomy is the way steroid-using body builders
make their own contrast between the ‘use’ and ‘abuse’ of drugs. For body builders it is
relevant to distance themselves from ‘unwelcome associations with other drug-users’
(Bloor et al., 1998: 29; Monaghan, 2002).
5. Coffey, W. (24 March 2002) Flipping Over Flop. Fosbury says Jump, Prep Kids Go High
(<www.fordhamprep.org/track/0102/fosbury.htm>).
6. In biomechanical terms, the high jump is a controlled acceleration using centripetal
force to put the body in position to convert horizontal speed into vertical velocity,
propelling the centre of mass over the crossbar. Two aspects are important when
crossing the bar. First, the highest point of the centre of gravity path should be above
the bar and not behind or below it. The second aspect is that the centre of gravity path
should pass as close as possible to the bar.
7. Some elite high jumpers persevered with the straddle. American high jumpers Pat
Matzdorf and Dwight Stones remained elite jumpers with the straddle technique in the
seventies (Stones combined it with the flop). Women have jumped more than 2 m and
men more than 2.35 m with the straddle technique (even 10 years later), which would
still be top performances today.
8. <www.highjumpworld.com/HJstore/nelson/bkintro.htm>; accessed 28 May 2003.
9. <www.highjumpworld.com/HJstore/nelson/bkintro.htm>; accessed 28 May 2003.
10. <hipcat.hungary.org/users/hipcat/olympic_1960.htm>.
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11. The disappearance of the straddle does seem to indicate the universal superiority of the
flop. This is also supported by the fact that Fosbury was not the first and only one to
discover the ‘backward’ technique. At the same time that Fosbury introduced the Flop,
Canadian Debbie Brill went through a similar process and developed the so-called Brill
Bend. If her records had spread a few years earlier, perhaps people would be talking of
‘bending’ instead of flopping.
12. <www.strc.ucalgary.ca/faq_long2.htm>.
13. The current male record holder Cuban Javier Sotomayor is 1.93 m tall (he jumped 2.45
m), which means that he jumped 52 cm more than his own height. One could argue
that body height is so dominant that it should be factored into the outcome. Swedish
high jumper Stefan Holm, Olympic gold medallist in Athens 2004 (with 2.36 m) and
the American Franklin Jacobs would then be the record holders with a jump 59 cm
higher than their own height (Holm, 1.81 m tall, jumped 2.40 m; Jacobs, 1.73 m tall,
jumped 2.32 m).
14. Of course, this does not preclude a more efficient way of high jumping. Fosbury
could only become identified with the flop because of a simple change of rules.
Similarly, another superior technique may eventually be established, which is for the
moment limited by the rules. For example, some people believe that new records will
be broken if the rule of jumping from one foot is changed, and competitors are
allowed to jump with two feet at the same time. Hans Kuiper, a civil engineer, has
even tried to attach his own name to a ‘two-feet-jump’ launched from a tumbling
approach (for an animation of the ‘Kuiper flop’, see <web.inter.nl.net/hcc/Hans.
Kuiper/highjump.htm>).
15. The term klapskate seems by now internationally accepted, although the spelling may
be adapted to different languages (in German: Klappschlittschuh) and some still
prefer to call it the clapskate or slapskate. The term is not based on the klapping or
slapping sound of the returning blade (the Dutch word for ‘to slap’ is ‘klappen’).
Rather, it refers to the extra slap (klap) on the ice that enables the skater to slap an
extra amount of work per stroke (De Koning et al., 2000). The ISU President,
Ottavio Cinquanta, tried to call for a renaming because ‘clap’ is slang for a sexually
transmitted disease.
16. The first patents of the idea were granted to the Englishman Charles Corneby in 1884,
in 1891 to the American John Diedrich Freese, and in 1894 to the German Karl
Hannes (Blauw, 2001: 93).
17. This was not unfamiliar to Fosbury: ‘The elite athletes were not interested in dropping
12 years of dedication and practice to switch over to something that was unproven’
(<groups.yahoo.com/group/highjump/message/1060-25k>).
18. From a biomechanical perspective skating is a much more efficient method of
locomotion. Elite skaters reach speeds of more than 60 km per hour. An elite sprinter is
able to stay close to the skater for a maximum of about 100 m. This has to do with the
low friction of ice and because the push-off is executed against a gliding skate. That
means that the speed of locomotion becomes independent of leg extension velocity
(Houdijk, 2001: 15–16).
19. CBS Sports Line wire reports, ISU considering clap skate controls (8 January 1998, from:
<http://home1.gte.net/pjbemail/ClapSk8_ISU.html>).
20. Although biomechanical evidence was already provided by Van Ingen Schenau in the
early 1980s, it was not until the winter of 1994–95 that the klapskates were actually
tried for the first time by junior skaters on a regional team (De Koning et al., 2000).
21. The German newspaper, Rhein Zeitung, headlined: ‘De Jong “klapperte” auf Goldkurs’
and called it ‘den Siegeszug des Klappschlittschuhs’ (13 January 1997). Niemann said
that she would start training with ‘Klappi’ immediately. De Jong also won the European
Championship for speed skating in 1999.
22. Interesting in the relation between biomechanical theory and speed skating practice is
the fact that by now the practice runs ahead of the scientific data. The klapskates are
much faster than was hypothesized from biomechanical and exercise physiological data
(De Koning et al., 2000: 1229).
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23. Although some of the high expectations have been tempered (cf. Steinacker & Wolfarth,
2002), the discussion on gene doping has past the stage of mere speculation. Before the
start of the Olympic Winter Games (Torino 2006), emails of the German athletic coach 
Springstein were found in which he asked for the gene therapeutic medicine Repoxygen
(‘EPO-gene’).
24. Cf. Munthe (2000). The use of genetic information for selection raises complex (legal)
issues, for example, on the privacy of the athlete (see Australian Law Reform
Commission/Australian Health Ethics Committee, 2003) and on (the limits of) ‘athletic
predestination’ (Tamburrini, 2002; Hilvoorde, 2005).
25. The International Conference on Gene Technology in Elite Sports (University of Sport,
Stockholm, 22 and 23 May 2003).
26. The example is not as speculative as it seems, after the accusations against the top
Australian swimmer Ian Thorpe. Thorpe – with the extreme shoe size 17 – was accused
by other elite swimmers of taking human growth hormone. Whatever the origin of his
foot size, the fact is that Thorpe has considerable advantage when using his feet as a
pair of ‘flippers’. Australian coach Brian Sutton said: ‘If you were going to do a
Frankenstein, if you were going to put a swimmer together from scratch, you’d build
Ian Thorpe’ (<www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,4807-502474,00.html>).
27. The issue of early selection and talent is beyond the scope of this paper. Some of the
objections against ‘athletic predestination’ of children are: an instrumental relation with
the offspring, the idea of exploiting talent and endangering the right to an open future.
This widely discussed concept of an open future raises other complex issues and does not
offer unambiguous criteria (see Davis, 2001; Savulescu, 2001; Tamburrini, 2002;
Hilvoorde, 2005).
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